Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2002

State of Utah v. Richard Dale Houston : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kris C. Leonard; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Byron F.
Burmester; Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney; Attorneys for Apellee.
Heather Johnson; David P.S. Mack; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Richard Dale Houston, No. 20020526 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3854

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20020526-CA

RICHARD DALE HOUSTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A
FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 766-302 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE ANN M.
BOYDEN, PRESIDING

HEATHER JOHNSON (6934)
DAVID P.S. MACK (4370)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

KRIS C. LEONARD (4902)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P O BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
BYRON F. BURMESTER (6844)
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee
J , l L,-

t £vw

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20020526-CA

RICHARD DALE HOUSTON,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A
FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 766-302 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE ANN M.
BOYDEN, PRESIDING

HEATHER JOHNSON (6934)
DAVID P.S. MACK (4370)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

KRIS C. LEONARD (4902)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P O BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
BYRON F. BURMESTER (6844)
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE RESCHEDULING OF THE
TRIAL BEYOND THE DETAINER PERIOD TO THE COURT'S
NEXT AVAILABLE DATE WAS DONE TO ACCOMMODATE
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S SCHEDULE, PROVIDING "GOOD
CAUSE" UNDER THE DETAINER STATUTE

9

A.

Introduction

9

B.

The Relevant Record

13

C.

Defense Counsel's Scheduling Conflict Provides "Good Cause"
For Rescheduling The Trial Beyond The Detainer Period
CONCLUSION

i

18
21

ADDENDA
Addendum A.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999)

Addendum B.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999)

Addendum C.

2002 Calendar

Addendum D.

Defendant's Notice and Request for Disposition of Charges
(R. 13-15)

Addendum E.

Trial Court's Various Rulings
(R. 272: 10-21) (March 11 pretrial conference)
(R. 271: 5-8) (April 22 pretrial conference)

Addendum F.

Unsigned Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(R. 133-36)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986)

13

State v. Bonny, All P.2d 147 (Utah 1970)

19

State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, 34 P.3d 790,
cert, denied, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002)

2, 9, 12, 13, 19

State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998)

passim

State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92
State v. Petersen, 810P.2d421 (Utah 1991)
State v. Peterson, 2002 UT App 53,42 P.3d 1258
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993)
State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403 (Utah 1982)
State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982)
State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1985)

10
11, 13
1,2
2, 13
11
11, 13
11

State v. Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146,473 Utah Adv. Rep. 57

12, 13

State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1989)

10

State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361,453 P.2d 158 (1969)

11

State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 1987)

11

iii

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1999)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999)

14

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999)

2, 10,20

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 2002)

1

IV

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20020526-CA

v.
RICHARD DALE HOUSTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) (contained in Addendum A).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(Supp. 2002), pursuant to a transfer order of the Utah Supreme court dated August 27,2002.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The only issue this Court should reach is whether the trial court properly extended the
trial date "to a reasonable time outside the disposition period to accommodate, in part,
defense counsel's schedule."
The trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under the
detainer statute is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Peterson, 2002 UT App

53, U 5,42 P.3d 1258; State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,fflf3-4,34 P.3d 790, cert denied,
42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002).

This Court reviews the underlying legal conclusions for

correctness and the factual findings for clear error. See Peterson, 2002 UT App 53, ^[5;
Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ff 3-4. The attribution of delay to a party is a factual finding,
reviewed for clear error. See Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^j 4, n.4; State v. Phathammavong,
860 P.2d 1001,1004 (Utah App. 1993). The determination of the existence of "good cause"
under the speedy trial statute is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. See State v.
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The only statute relevant to the issue to be addressed on appeal is Utah Code Ann. §
77-29-1 (1999), and it is contained in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Because the chronology of the proceedings in this matter is critical in applying Utah's
statute on speedy trial rights, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), the relevant dates and
corresponding undisputed facts are presented as follows1:
Nov. 29, 2001

An information was filed charging defendant Richard Dale
Houston and Gabriel Valenzuela as co-defendants with one
count of aggravated robbery (R. 3-5).

Dec. 8,2001

Defendant signed his "Notice and Request for Disposition of
Pending Charge(s)" [disposition request] (R. 13-15) (attached in
Addendum D).

1

A 2002 calendar is included in Addendum C for the reader's convenience.
2

Dec. 14, 2001

The prison stamps as received defendant's disposition request
(id.). Add. D.

Dec. 20, 2001

Thi. roll call hearing was held at which the preliminary hearing
was set for January 15, 2002 (R. 16).

Jan. 15, 2002

A joint preliminary hearing was begun for both defendants, but
was halted at noon (R. 28-29). Neither counsel was available to
continue the hearing into the afternoon, and the prosecutor
raised the fact that a disposition request had been filed (R. 255:
45). The court informed defense counsel that despite his
scheduling problem, "we're going to have to push on. I mean,
I'm not going to do anything that's going to jeopardize the
detainer. That's not going to happen." (Id.). The court recessed
the hearing at 12:30 p.m. after scheduling the matter to continue
the next day (R. 28-29).

Jan. 16, 2002

Despite "heroic efforts," the court was unable to convince the
prison to transport defendant for the remainder of the
preliminary hearing on such short notice (R. 255: 46-47). After
discussing the detainer problem with counsel, the judge
attempted to set the matter for January 22 (R. 255: 47). Due to
a conflict with the schedule of co-defendant's counsel, the
matter was continued to January 24, the court's next available
date (id.).

Jan. 24, 2002

The preliminary hearing was completed, and the court found
probable cause to bind both defendants over (R. 255:93-94). In
discussing the setting of the arraignment, the prosecutor noted,
"There's that issue of the detainer. I would like to keep this
moving along as best we can. The earlier we can get in to see
Judge Boydon [sic] the better" (R. 255:94). The arraignment
was set for February 11 (R. 30).

Feb. 11,2002

At the arraignment, the prosecutor filed a motion and supporting
memorandum for a joint trial with dual juries (R. 31-39).
Because both defendants had different counsel from LDA, and
the co-defendant had given evidence against Houston, conflict
counsel became necessary (R. 31 -32). The prosecutor explained
that the motion was prompted because "both defendants have
filed detainers. Thus, severance is not an option because any
3

delay seriously jeopardizes the State's ability to try both cases."
(R. 32). The prosecutor explained that he suggested the dual
jury procedure because "dual juries would save the case from
dismissal through [the] detainer
If the cases are severed as
a result of the Bruton problem, the State will likely be unable to
prosecute both cases within the 120-day window. Thus, one or
both cases may be dismissed. The dual jury procedure solves
this problem." (R. 35). The minutes reflect, "on defense
motion, conflict counsel to be appointed" (R. 259). The matter
was continued to February 25 (R. 260-62).2
Feb. 25, 2002

The trial court set the three-day jury trial for March 13 through
15—sixteen days away (R. 260-61).

Feb. 27, 2002

The prosecutor provided written notice of its expert witnesses
(R. 41-42). Br.ofAplt.at31,n.31.

Mar. 8, 2002

The prosecutor filed a list of proposed witnesses at trial which
included experts (R. 47-49). He also filed a motion in limine
seeking to have the court admit the DNA testing results
involving blood from the victim and each co-defendant as well
as blood found on the victim's clothing and a wall near the
scene of the crime (R. 50-59).

Mar. 11, 2002

A pretrial conference was held at which defendant objected to
the State's proposed expert witnesses because the State failed to
give defendant thirty days' notice as required by statute (R. 272:
5-7, 15-16). Add. B. Defendant noted that the appropriate
remedy would be continuance, which would extend the matter
beyond the detainer period, or exclusion of the evidence, which
would permit trial in two days as scheduled (R. 272: 6). The
prosecutor emphasized that the appropriate remedy was a
continuance, and that the continuance should not be deducted
from the detainer period (R. 272: 4). The trial judge ruled that
she would not suppress or exclude the DNA evidence where the
setting of the trial only sixteen days after the arraignment left the
State unable to meet the thirty-day notice requirement for its

2

The case against the co-defendant apparently was later reassigned to another
judge, and the State's motion for a dual jury was stricken (R. 272: 15).
4

expert witnesses, and the prosecutor submitted the notice within
two days of trial being set (R. 272: 13-14; R. 41-42) (the ruling
is attached in Addendum E). The court left it to defendant to
decide whether a continuance would be necessary to permit him
to meet the expert testimony and have a fair trial (R. 272: 1718). Defendant objected to the situation, but chose the
continuance (R. 272: 18). The trial court ruled that the
continuance was "technically" granted to the State due to its
failure to comply with the thirty-day notice requirement, and
noted that defendant did not waive his statutory speedy trial
right (R. 272: 17-18). Add. E.
However, in attempting to reschedule the trial, problems arose
between defense counsel's availability and the trial court's
calendar (R. 272: 18-19). Add. E. The court attempted to set
the date inside the detainer period, but defense counsel was
unavailable (R. 272: 18-19). The judge then offered her next
available date of April 24, 25, and 26, with the judge expressly
noting that those days were past the disposition period (R. 272:
20-21). Add.E.
Mar. 19, 2002

The prosecutor filed a motion and supporting memorandum,
asking the court to reconsider its finding that the fourteen-day
delay occasioned by defendant's need to obtain conflict counsel
should have been attributed to defendant and should have tolled
the detainer period (R. 84-91).3

3

The record contains no evidence of a ruling on this motion. At the April 22
pretrial hearing, defense counsel made the following comment:
I think I know where we are going with this [discussion of
responsibility for earlier delays]. We talked about this basically the last
time we were here when the State had filed a Motion to Reconsider, I guess,
the reason for the continuance the second time. So we know what the likely
ruling will be. . . .
(R. 272: 3). The only other evidence of a hearing after the State filed its motion on March
19 is a mention in the docket of a hearing on April 1 (R. 220). No minutes or explanation
of the content of that hearing appear in the record.
5

Apr. 12, 2002

The final day of the original, uninterrupted 120-day detainer
period as believed by the trial court and the parties (R. 271: 6;
R. 272: 18). Br. of Aplt. at 16-17. Add. C.

Apr. 18, 2002

Defendant filed a motion and supporting memorandum to
dismiss the charge against him, alleging a violation of his
statutory speedy trial rights (R. 143-48).

Apr. 22, 2002

A pretrial conference occurred, at which the trial court heard
argument on the earlier delays caused by the need for conflict
counsel and the inadequate notice provided for the State's expert
witnesses (R. 271: 1-8). The court then ruled that it would not
attribute the delays to either party but that both delays warranted
reasonable continuances under the circumstances (R. 271:7-8)
(the ruling is attached in Addendum E). The court also denied
defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 271: 8). Add. E.
The prosecutor submitted at the April 22 hearing proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law which correctly reflected
the trial court's verbal rulings on the various delays and the
scheduling of the trial (R. 271:8-9; R. 133-36) (the document is
attached in Addendum F). These findings were never signed
{id.).

Apr. 24, 2002

Trial began (R. 248).

Apr. 26, 2002

Following a three-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of
aggravated robbery, but did not find that he had used a knife in
the crime (R. 205-06).

July 1,2002

Defendant was sentenced to five-years-to-life in the Utah State
Prison, with the sentence to run consecutively with the time he
was then serving in prison (R. 226-27).

July 9,2002

Defendant timely submitted a notice of appeal (R. 228-29)

Aug. 27, 2002

The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court (R.
251).

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The particular facts of defendant's crimes are not relevant to determination of the
issues on appeal. However, they are briefly summarized for the reader's information.
On October 23,2001, the victim, Rafael Duran, and a friend went to Sociables, a bar
in Salt Lake City (R. 256: 105-06). He carried with him his cell phone together with a
sizeable amount of money in his wallet (R. 256: 107-08).
Duran's money eventually came to the attention of defendant and Gabriel Valenzuela
(R. 256: 136). They decided to rob Duran (R. 256: 137). While at the bar, Duran lent his
cell phone to someone, and it was passed around to several other people who made calls on
it (R. 256:12). Duran attempted to keep tabs on his phone and eventually noticed defendant
walk outside with it (R. 256: 123-24, 127). When he did not return, Duran went outside to
get it (R. 256: 113).
Duran never knew what hit him, and was unconscious for approximately two weeks
(R. 255: 10-11). He was discovered shortly after the attack by bar patrons who called 911
(R. 257: 221-22). He had suffered two knife cuts on his back, three on his upper chest, one
on his left forearm, and one on his left arm (R. 257: 210). He had also suffered a severe head
injury and had undergone surgery to relieve the bleeding on his brain (R. 257:210,216). His
wallet and cell phone were never located (R. 256: 115).
Bar patrons were instrumental in identifying a truck seen speeding from the scene,
defendant, and Valenzuela, his co-defendant (R. 258:420-22; R. 257:222-23,238-44; R. 256:
162-65; State's Exh. 25). Police later obtained the truck, which was registered to defendant
7

(R. 258: 425; R. 257: 236). Defendant was found to have a large, fresh cut between his right
thumb and forefinger (State's Exh. 21). The police took blood samples from several places,
including the scene of the attack, the victim's clothing, the inside and outside of defendant's
truck, as well as from defendant (R. 257: 251-59,262-66,278-83,287-88,293-94, 308-23).
DNA testing provided a match between the scene of the crime, the victim's clothing, and
defendant (R. 257: 351-52).
Defendant and Mr. Valenzuela were charged as co-defendants (R. 3-5).

Mr.

Valenzuela later testified against defendant (R. 133-51).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court need not reach any of defendant' s three arguments because, even assuming
defendant would prevail on the merits of his claims and the total amount of the delays should
not toll the running of the 120-day disposition period, the final trial setting was supported by
"good cause" under the speedy trial statute because it was necessary to accommodate defense
counsel's schedule. Because the original trial date was set for only sixteen days after the
arraignment, the prosecutor was not able to provide defendant with the statutory thirty days'
notice of the expert witnesses he intended to use at trial. At the pretrial conference on March
11, the trial judge determined that a trial continuance was necessary to permit defendant the
full amount of notice and, hence, a fair trial. The trial court offered to set the trial during the
first week of April, which would have permitted defendant the full notice period as well as
allowed the trial to occur within the original detainer period. The only reason the trial was
not set for this period was because defense counsel was going to be out of town. The next
8

available date on the court's calendar for a felony jury trial was April 24—eleven days
beyond the actual end of the original detainer period.4 Extending the disposition period
beyond the 120-day period to accommodate defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good
cause" under the detainer statute. The trial court therefore properly scheduled the trial for
its next available date beyond April 13 and correctly denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE RESCHEDULING OF THE TRIAL
BEYOND THE DETAINER PERIOD TO THE COURT'S NEXT
AVAILABLE DATE WAS DONE TO ACCOMMODATE DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S SCHEDULE, PROVIDING "GOOD CAUSE" UNDER
THE DETAINER STATUTE
A.

Introduction
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the

trial court erroneously considered "reasonableness" in determining the existence of "good
cause" for delays of the detainer period, and that the court ignored its responsibility to
attribute all delays to one party or the other in order to determine whether to toll the detainer

4

Defendant claims that the original, uninterrupted detainer period ended on April
12, 2002. Br. of Aplt. at 16-17. However, properly counted according to this Court's
decision in State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, % 6, n.7, the period actually would have
ended on April 13. See Argument, section A, infra.
9

period found in Utah Code Ann. § 11-29A (1999), Utah's intrastate speedy trial statute.5
This provision, which outlines defendant's statutory speedy trial right, provides:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information,
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court... may be granted any reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or
within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel
moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard
within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous
motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter
dismissed with prejudice.
(Emphasis added). Add. B. The purpose of section 77-29-1 is "to protect the constitutional
right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to prevent those charged with enforcement of criminal

5

Although defendant mentions his constitutional right to a speedy trial (Br. of Aplt.
at 2-3, 34), his arguments below and on appeal pertain solely to his state statutory right.
Accordingly, this Court need only address the statutory right. See, e.g., State v. Hovater,
914 P.2d 37, 39 n.l (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Litherland, 2000
UT 76, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Webb, 119 P.2d 1108, 1111 n.4 (Utah 1989).
10

statutes from holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed charges against him." State v.
Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 404-05 (Utah 1982) (citing State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah
1982) and referencing the purpose of the predecessor speedy trial statute); accord State v.
Viles, 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) (stating the purpose of section 77-29-1 in similar
terms); see also State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 362, 453 P.2d 158, 159 (1969) (citing the
purpose of the predecessor statute).
The statute outlines the responsibilities of both parties in bringing about a speedy
resolution of charges. While the prosecution carries the ultimate burden of bringing the
matter to trial within 120 days of the filing of a disposition request, defendant has the
threshold burden of ensuring that the statute is properly invoked. See State v. Heaton, 958
P.2d 911, 915-16 (Utah 1998) (when a prisoner delivers a written notice pursuant to the
statute, then the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the matter heard in 120 days,
which does not start until notice is properly delivered under the statute); State v. Petersen,
810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991) (describing the prosecutor's burden); State v. Wright, 745
P.2d 447,450-51 (Utah 1987) (the request must be appropriately sent to the right people and
contain an appropriate demand in order to be effective); Viles, 702 P.2d at 1175 (the burden
is on the prisoner to give proper notice before being entitled to have charges disposed of in
the statutory period); Wilson, 453 P.2d at 160 (describing the prosecutor's burden). Once a
defendant has properly invoked the statute to start the 120-day period running, thereby
shifting the burden to the prosecution to ensure a timely trial, defendant must not unduly

11

delay matters or the delay may be charged against him and the 120-day period extended. See
/feflfofl,958P.2dat916.
"[W]hether the district court properly denied [a defendant's] motion to dismiss
pursuant to the detainer [or speedy trial] statute requires a two-step inquiry." State v.
Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146, % 8,473 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (quotation and emphasis omitted,
alterations in original). "First, we must determine when the 120 day period commenced and
when it expired. Second, if the trial was held beyond the 120 day period, we must then
determine whether 'good cause' excused the delay." Id. (quoting State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT
App 379, f 9,18 P.3d 504 (additional citation omitted)). If no good cause excused the delay,
then the "court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice." Wagenman, 2002 UT App
146,19 (quoting Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1(4)); see also Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916-17 (noting
that good cause excuses non-compliance with the statute).
In this case, the parties and the trial court relied on the prison's receipt of the
disposition request on December 14, 2001, as the start of the 120-day detainer period (R.
271: 6; R. 272:18). Defendant accepts this point on appeal. Br. of Aplt. at 16-17. However,
this Court has determined that the 120-day period commences the day following the date
stamped on the disposition request as the date the prison received the notice. See State v.
Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, K 6 n.7, 34 P.3d 790, cert denied, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002).
Accordingly, the first day of the detainer period would be December 15, 2001, and the last
day of the uninterrupted 120-day detainer period in this case would be April 13, 2002, not
April 12. See Add. C. The trial was scheduled to begin on April 24—eleven days beyond
12

the end of the original, uninterrupted 120-day period. Hence, the question is whether "good
cause" existed to extend the 120 days beyond April 13. See Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146,

118.
"Good cause" means: "(1) delay caused by the defendant—such as asking for a
continuance; or (2) 'a relatively short delay caused by unforseen problems arising
immediately prior to trial.'" Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,1f 6 (quoting Petersen, 810 P.2d
at 426 (footnote omitted)); see also Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916 ("when a prisoner himself acts
to delay the trial, he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy
trial"); State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325, 1329-30 (Utah 1986) (defendant's delay of a trial
constitutes a temporary waiver of his statutory right to a speedy trial); Velasquez, 641 P.2d
at 116 (same under predecessor statute); accord State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001,
1004-05 (Utah App. 1993).
B.

The Relevant Record
The rescheduling of the trial beyond the detainer period occurred at the pretrial

conference on March 11, 2002. The prosecutor raised the issue of his late notice of expert
witnesses, explained why he was unable to provide a full thirty days' notice, and
acknowledged that defendant would be entitled to seek a continuance for the remainder of
the thirty-day period in order to meet the expert testimony (R. 272:4-5).6 Defendant wanted

6

The prosecutor assured the trial court that the reports of the DNA expert and the
serologist were "handed to defense counsel at the preliminary hearing]" and that the
medical records were sent as part of the "initial discovery" (R. 272: 9-10). It was only the
curriculum vitae and the notice that were sent on February 27, completing the information
13

to proceed with the March 13 trial, but only upon exclusion of the State's expert testimony
(R. 272: 8). The trial judge then explained her understanding of the issue before her:
All right. This is clearly something that does require some balancing
on the Court's part because we have almost what would appear to be
conflicting rights—not conflicting, but rights that the defendant does enjoy
that the Court is going to do everything I can to make sure that you have the
timely trial on this matter, but at the same time it needs to be a fair and just
trial. And if your counsel cannot go forward on this week's setting because
they do not have the information that they need, then it may very well be that
the interests ofjustice dictate that, in order for you, Mr. Houston, to have a fair
trial, that it needs to be delayed.
That then raises the issue that you have made, the detainer. But the
detainer is not so absolute that the Court cannot take into consideration all of
those issues and all of these balancing issues.
While the defendant has not requested continuances, the fact is, there
needs to be a delay because there was a conflict in the Legal Defender's office
with counsel and there needed to be an appointment of counsel and that caused
a delay. In fact, those are the delays that have been involved in this court
before me, because it was not bound over to me until after the January 24th
preliminary hearing bindover. It was immediately set on my calendar in a
timely fashion for the arraignment; and then that was continued. So we do
have continuances here.
It's not particularly important that I call them either defense or State's
except that we do have the 120-day disposition request. And so I need to make
sure that I am not granting more time than is appropriate because the defendant
has not requested it, and I, in fact, did set the jury trial on March 13th, 14th and
15th.
Those dates are still available. The Court is still scheduled to do that.
Apparently the State is still ready to go forward but has not given the
defendant the 30-day notice required by law on the expert witnesses].

required by statute to be given to defendant (R. 272: 10). None of the experts testified at
the preliminary hearing. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5) (1999).
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That I now need to take into consideration. More than just saying, Do
you wish your notice or not, if it's something that Mr. Houston feels he cannot
be prepared to go to trial on March 13th, 14th and 15th because he has not
received the substance of those reports and cannot prepare adequately for cross
examination—and again, I am not characterizing this one way or another as a
defense request or a State request—I need to be able to weigh the interests of
justice here and determine whether or not I am denying Mr. Houston a right
to a fair trial by requiring him to go forward this week if the defense doesn't
feel that they have had adequate time to prepare for cross examination of
expert witnesses. That's the only question. I'm not saying that it will then be
counted as your continuance request.
(R. 272: 10-12). Add. E.
Defendant objected to the court's characterization of the situation and continued to
seek exclusion of the expert testimony because of the lack of adequate notice (R. 272:12-13).
Add. E. The court responded:
All right. Then I will rule on that issue then, that I am not going to
suppress the DNA results simply because the notice has not been met. The
requirements that the State provide that notice are in place. But the fact that
it was bound over on January 24th at a preliminary hearing, there was no jury
trial date set, and I do not feel that it warrants suppression of the evidence
because they did not provide that notice at the bindover date.
The arraignment date on February 11th was continued to February 25th.
And the February 25th date was when it was scheduled for jury trial, and that
is the date that I'm going for.[7] So I am not going to suppress the evidence
itself because the 30-day notice requirement was not given from the January
24th hearing. . . .
To exclude it. . . . And that is a more accurate
characterization. So I am denying the motion to exclude.
(R. 272: 13-14). Add. E. The trial court also included the remaining expert testimony at
issue in its ruling (R. 272: 14). Add. E.

7

Defendant agrees that the official notice of expert witnesses was filed two days
after the trial date was set—on February 27 (R. 41-42; R. 272: 5-6). Br. of Aplt. at 35-38.
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Defendant declared that he could not proceed to trial as scheduled without the
statutory notice (R. 272:16). Add. E. He refused to request a continuance, but agreed that
the trial must be rescheduled (id.). Add. E. The trial judge then explained her position:
And I just want to clarify my ruling a little bit.
It is true that I have ruled that I will not exclude the testimony or the
expert witnesses based on the noncompliance with the 30 days because I just
simply did not find the bad faith necessary in the failure to comply with the 30day notice. The State has done it as quickly as they can in the trial setting.
And so by not excluding the testimony, or excluding the witnesses I guess, by
default, I guess that means I am granting the continuance and it is to the
requesting party.
What I asked the defendant then was, based on the fact that there is
currently before me a 120-day disposition, I needed to have the input as to
whether or not the defendant felt he could be prepared to go forward so that,
even though the remedy I have provided and the remedy that is provided by
statute is a continuance for the proponent party, I wanted the input as to
whether or not the defendant felt that he could have a fair trial and be
adequately prepared. That is the answer that Mr. Mack [defense counsel] has
given me today after consulting with both his client, Mr. Houston, and with the
office. And they do not feel that they can be fairly prepared for the series of
charges without having more time to examine the testimony which I have not
excluded.
The continuance, therefore, I guess, technically, is being granted to the
State because they have not provided, technically, the 30-day notice and they
do need to do that. But the issue before me, which was more important to me,
is just the granting of a fair and timely trial for Mr. Houston. [8]
The 120-day disposition date, my understanding, after reviewing the
calendar with both Mr. Mack and Mr. Burmester [the prosecutor], is April 12th.

8

At a later hearing, the trial court noted and rejected defendant's argument—set
forth on appeal—that the prosecutor should have complied with the notice requirement as
early as the preliminary hearing, even though the case had not been bound over, the
parties had not appeared before this judge, and a trial date had not been set (R. 271: 7).
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We can do what flexibility we need to set that during that time frame [sic].
The defendant is not waiving that 120-day request.
Again, I know that there are other issues that I need to balance that
against. And I will set it as quickly as we can, but we are to the March 11th
date. That puts it within a month. I do have several other jurys that are set,
many of them in custody, and I'll throw out some dates and see what we can
[do]. Whether or not that can be before April 12th is another issue.
(R. 272: 17-18). Add. E.
During the discussion of potential trial dates which followed the judge's explanation,
the trial judge determined that the last day of the required thirty-day notice period was the
end of March (R. 272: 20). Add. E. The judge offered to free the court's calendar to set the
felony jury trial the first week of April, within the original, uninterrupted detainer period (R.
272: 18-19). Defense counsel stated that he could not do it that week because he was to be
out of town for all but one day of that week (R. 272: 18-19). Add. E. The parties discussed
the next available date of April 24, and the judge explained:
All right. Let's set this for April 24, 25 and 26. And the record will
reflect that that is past the 120-day disposition. The Court knows that as we
are doing it and it's past the 30 days for the expert-witness notice. But it is the
soonest I can set it on the calendar, given that the defense counsel is not going
to be here the first week of April and the [weeks of the] 8th and 15th are master
calendars for the Court. And I don't have the flexibility of setting during those
weeks, so I am setting them the next available date that I have for a felony jury
[trial].
(R. 272: 20-21). Add. E.
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C.

Defense Counsel's Scheduling Conflict Provides "Good Cause" For Rescheduling
The Trial Beyond The Detainer Period
Defendant claims three periods of delay, arguing that they should not toll the detainer

period: 1) the prison's refusal to transport defendant to court for the second day of what was
anticipated to be a one-day preliminary hearing, which resulted in a seven-day delay in
completing the hearing9; 2) the State's motion for a joint trial with dual juries, which
allegedly prompted a fourteen-day delay to obtain conflict counsel for one defendant10; and
3) the prosecutor's inadequate notice of expert witnesses, which allegedly prompted a fortytwo day delay in the trial setting. Br. of Aplt. at 18-41. The trial court did not address the
prison's delay, but determined that the need for conflict counsel and the need to provide a
full thirty days' notice of the expert witnesses required reasonable continuances under the
detainer statute (R. 271: 5; R. 272: 5-7).
Rather than reviewing all of defendant's claims and the trial court's multiple rulings
thereon, this Court need only address the question of whether the setting of the trial date

9

The trial court did not toll the period for this first period, even though the need for
a second day to complete the preliminary hearing was caused, in part, by the schedule of
one of the defense counsel, thereby providing "good cause" for rescheduling the hearing.
Cf.9 Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917.
10

Defendant fails to recognize that once the co-defendant decided to testify against
defendant, conflict counsel would need to be appointed anyway. Counsel for the codefendant recognized as much because, at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, he
informed the prosecutor that he needed to conflict out of the case (R. 271: 3-4). The
prosecutor filed its motion thereafter only because the change of attorneys had not
occurred, and he did not want further delay to cause dismissal of the case against either
defendant, both of whom had filed disposition requests (R. 35; R. 271: 4).
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beyond the detainer period to accommodate defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good
cause" under the detainer statute. The record clearly shows that the trial would have been
set within the original uninterrupted 120-day period but for defense counsel's
unavailability.11 The three-day trial was set for the next available setting on the trial court's
calendar for a felony jury trial, extending it beyond the end of the original detainer period.
See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916 (Utah 1998) ("this court may affirm a trial court's decision on
any reasonable legal basis, provided that any rationale for affirmance finds support in the
record."); Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, f 14, n.9.
"[EJxtending the trial date to a reasonable time outside the disposition period to
accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes 'good cause' under section 7729-1(3) and (4)[.]" Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917; see also State v. Bonny, All P.2d 147,148 (Utah

ll

The prosecutor raised the issue below in his Motion to Reconsider Finding[s],
filed March 19, 2002 (R. 89-90). Findings and conclusions on this point were included in
the unsigned Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 133-36). Add. F. The record
undeniably reflects the facts relevant to defense counsel's schedule as stated herein, even
though the only mention made by the trial court of the scheduling problem was brief:
. . . The resetting [of the trial] was done as quickly as we could.
A number of days were discussed and this was the first day that we
could get all parties here, so the April 24th date, which is scheduled this
week and which is apparently going forward, is a reasonable date as the
court calendar and every other circumstance could be taken into
consideration, if I find that it was not unreasonable to delay it because of
the expert witness issue and the conflict of counsel issue. I find both of
those reasons good [cause] for delay, so I am denying Mr. Houston's
Motion to Dismiss because it was not held within the 120 days.
(R.271:8). Add.E.
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1970) (setting the trial outside the statutory period to accommodate defense counsel's
schedule was "entirely reasonable and practical").
The Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Heaton is dispositive of defendant's appeal. In
Heaton, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the propriety of a trial setting outside the detainer
period because of a conflict with defense counsel's schedule. Id. at 917. The date initially
offered by the trial court in that case was within the disposition period, but both the
prosecutor and defense counsel were involved in another criminal trial on that date, requiring
that the trial be set at the next available date, one month beyond the disposition period. Id.
The supreme court determined that the second setting "was not unreasonable" in light of the
situation, and expressly held that, while there may have been error in some of the trial court's
legal conclusions, "extending the trial date to a reasonable time outside the disposition period
to accommodate, impart, defense counsel's schedule constitutes 'good cause' under section
77-29-1(3) and (4), and the trial court correctly denied Heaton's motion to dismiss." Id.
(emphasis added). In other words, the fact that the prosecutor bore partial responsibility for
setting the trial date outside the disposition period did not prevent the four-week delay in the
trial setting from being "reasonable" under the detainer statute.
Defendant addresses the scheduling conflict at two points in his brief, acknowledging
the basic record facts, apportioning responsibility for the delay to the court and the
prosecutor, and arguing, without mention of legal authority, that he should bear no
responsibility for the delay beyond the disposition period because his schedule became
relevant only because of the State's failure to give full notice of its expert witnesses. Br. of
20

Aplt. at 31 n.31, 40-41. Although the expert witness notice was the reason for having to
reschedule the trial, it was not the reason for scheduling the trial outside of the 120-day
detainer period. The trial could have been set within the original, uninterrupted detainer
period butfor defense counsel's schedule. The court calendar permitted it, nothing suggests
that the prosecutor was unavailable, and the sole reason the matter was not timely set the first
week of April was because defense counsel was unavailable. Accordingly, the rescheduling
of the trial date outside the original disposition period to the next available date because of
defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good cause" under the detainer statute, and the trial
court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this C ^ T ^ y o f July, 2003.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

IS C. LEONAI
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 8B
1999 REPLACEMENT

Titles 76 and 77

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be uin the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-302; 1975, ch. 51, § 1;
1969, ch. 170, § 7; 1994, ch. 271, § 1.

Addendum B

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 8B
1999 REPLACEMENT

Titles 76 and 77

77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for
failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
History: <\ 1963, 77-29-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, $ 2.

Addendum C
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Addendum D

'A-IA. .* 4J.N. 1 1

U

NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGE(S)

TO:

llfa/tl

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS

Notice is hereby given that I, £,( y,A^\ ^oLi^r^ ^
_
(Inmate Name)do hereby request final disposition. Charge(s) of
pending ag^nst me in the ^ U U b c i U ^<A A. yi/.r-f Court,
brought by
Q a W Uvt^ CIX...VKA
(prosecuting
agency e.g., county, city, Attorney General, etc. in the State of
Utah) and request is hereby made that you forward this notice to
the appropriate authorities together with such information as
required by law.

Dated this ^

day of Dc c IC\

(Month / Year) .

Inmate's N a m e c ^ / ^ s / ^ ^ t / c / X

USP#

'2L^^/S

J

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••*****^

I hereby certify that I have received a copy of the foregoing
notice this V day of *y.iZ- .^Lr: (Month / Year) .

/,IJL<:L-(L
/I
^/u^
Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit
USP, PO Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020
CUCF, PO Box 898, Gunnison, Utah 84634

(Revised 10/2000)
(TMF 05/05.06,0

\o

'\$£$$ r DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
^'77;f'f
\ DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS
hael O. Leavitt .
Governor ?
Mike Chabries j
Executive Director f
Scott V. Carver f
Division Director '

PO Box 250
Draper UT 84020
(801)576-7000

14 December 2001

Salt Lake City Prosecuting Attorney
2001 S State #S3400
SLC,UT 84109-1200
RE:

HOUSTON, Richard Dale
U.S.P.# 28987
DOB 11/08/79
YOUR CASE #011918410

Dear Sirs:
MR/MRS/MS Richard Dale Houston is currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison.
He/She is requesting disposition of untried charges of Aggravated Robbery, pending in
your jurisdiction. Enclosed is the appropriate paperwork to process his request.
Thank you for your assistance with this matter.
Sincerely,
Mr. Scott Carver, Director
of Institutional Operations
by: Alberta Smith
Records/Office Tech III

End. (2)
cc: Third District Court Clerk
Inmate File

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS
120-DAY DISPOSITION
TO:

Third District Court Clerk

RE:

HOUSTON, Richard Dale
Inmate Name

28987
USP#

TERM of COMMITMENT: Theft by Receiving Stolen Property 1-15 yrs.
Discharge Firearm from Vehicle/Highway 0-5
yrs, Poss/Purchase Dangerous WeaponRestricted 0-5 yrs.
TIME SERVED:
Approx 02 year(s) 03mo
TIME REMAINING:
Approx. 12 year(s) 09 mo
**time calculated may not include toll time/credit

time served**

PAROLE ELIGIBILITY:scheduled for parole 00/00/00

BOARD OF PARDONS
DECISION:

Hearing set for 00/00/00

Mr. Scott Carver, Director
Institutional Operations

Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit
Utah State Prison
P. 0. Box 250, Draper, UT
84020
cc:

file
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
) Case No.

) Transcript

RICHARD DALE HOUSTON,

..!

Defendant.

of:

) PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

1

1

011918410

II

f

1.

1

)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANN BOYDEN

SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 4 - 1 8 6 0

r-.'J >-* .
UtanO_- .

Pcufetts :*_
CJertccfiJry.

.',.-

\

MARCH 1 1 , 2002
FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEB 2 6 2003
/S//

SALT

LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

REPORTED BY:

SUZANNE WARNICK, RDR, CSR
238-7529
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counsel at the prelim, at least by the second day of the
prelim.
The way it worked, we had the initial day, the 22nd,
and we tried to continue it to the next day because of the
detainer because we couldn't quite finish it in time.

And the

prison couldn't transport on a one-day notice, so we showed up
in court and that's when I handed those reports, because I
received the DNA report the afternoon of the 22nd.

So those

reports were handed to him.
I thought that the physician's —
records were part of initial discovery.
doesn't have them somewhere —

the medical

If defense counsel

he should have had them.

We've

had them all along and they should have received them.
The CV and the notice were generated the week trial
was set in this court.

It wasn't the next day but it seems

like it was by the end of that week that we got them out.
that was last week —

If

I can't remember.

MR. MACK: The week of the 25th.
THE COURT: Which was the 25th when that was dated.
All right.

This is clearly something that does

require some balancing on the Court's part because we have
almost what would appear to be conflicting rights -- not
conflicting, but rights that the defendant does enjoy that the
Court is going to do everything I can to make sure that you
have the timely trial on this matter, but at the same time it
10

needs to be a fair and just trial.

And if your counsel cannot

go forward on this week's setting because they do not have the
information that they need, then it may very well be that the
interests of justice dictate that, in order for you,
Mr. Houston, to have a fair trial, that it needs to be
delayed•
That then raises the issue that you have made, the
detainer.

But the detainer is not so absolute that the Court

cannot take into consideration all of those issues and all of
these balancing issues.
While the defendant has not requested continuances,
the fact is, there needs to be a delay because there was a
conflict in the Legal Defender's office with counsel and there
needed to be an appointment of counsel and that caused a
delay.

In fact, those are the delays that have been involved

in this court before me, because it was not bound over to me
until after the January 24th preliminary hearing bindover.

It

was immediately set on my calendar in a timely fashion for the
arraignment; and then that was continued.

So we do have

continuances here.
It's not particularly important that I call them
either defense or State's except that we do have the 120-day
disposition request.

And so I need to make sure that I am not

granting more time than is appropriate because the defendant
has not requested it, and I, in fact, did set the jury trial
11

on March 13th, 14th and 15th.
Those dates are still available.
scheduled to do that.

The Court is still

Apparently the State is still ready to

go forward but has not given the defendant the 30-day notice
required by law on the expert witness.
That I now need to take into consideration.

More

than just saying, Do you wish your notice or not, if it's
something that Mr. Houston feels he cannot be prepared to go
to trial on March 13th, 14th and 15th because he has not
received the substance of those reports and cannot prepare
adequately for cross examination —

and again, I am not

characterizing this one way or another as a defense request or
a State request —

I need to be able to weigh the interests of

justice here and determine whether or not I am denying
Mr. Houston a right to a fair trial by requiring him to go
forward this week if the defense doesn't feel that they have
had adequate time to prepare for cross examination of expert
witnesses.

That's the only question.

I'm not saying that it

will then be counted as your continuance request.
MR. MACK: But, Judge, I don't think that frames it.
We don't agree with the framing on that.
to trial on Wednesday.

We are ready to go

But we don't believe the State should

be allowed, since they failed to comply with the notice
requirement, to use expert witnesses.
So we need to know, first, the Court's inclination
12

on whether the State can use those people or not, given their
failure to comply.
trial.

It's not that we1re not ready to go to

We want this date.

That's the question.

And he's not

willing to waive the failure to comply with the notice
requirement.
THE COURT: With as many motions as I do have from
the State, I do not have before me even a motion to suppress
the expert evidence because the notice requirement has not
been complied with.

That's really what we have been

addressing today, but I don't have that motion as well. We'll
leave these up and have those be motions in limine I guess is
what we have.
MR. MACK: I think it's a response to the State's
motion to admit these DNA testing results, Judge.

That's not

all that that motion is about.
THE COURT: So are you objecting to the admission of
the DNA testing results because you did not get the notice or
for other reasons as well?
MR. MACK: I think, first of all, because it's
improperly noticed.
THE COURT: All right.

Then I will rule on that

issue then, that I am not going to suppress the DNA results
simply because the notice has not been met.

The requirements

that the State provide that notice are in place.

But the fact

that it was bound over on January 24th at a preliminary
13

hearing, there was no jury trial date set, and I do not feel
that it warrants suppression of the evidence because they did
not provide that notice at the bindover date.
The arraignment date on February 11th was continued
to February 25th.

And the February 25th date was when it was

scheduled for jury trial, and that is the date that I'm going
for.

So I am not going to suppress the evidence itself

because the 30-day notice requirement was not given from the
January 24th hearing.
MR. MACK: Maybe I misspoke on my request, Judge. I
think it would be a request to exclude it, not to suppress it.
THE COURT: To exclude it.
is a more accurate characterization.

Oh, all right.

And that

So I am denying the

motion to exclude.
MR. MACK: Can we read into that that you would also
not exclude the doctor1s statement, Swen Swensen, and the
serologist Gabriel Bier's testimony for the same reason?
THE COURT: Not based on a lack-of-notice
requirement•
MR. MACK: Could we just have a short recess, Judge?
I would like to consult with my office about whether we want
to still keep this date this week or if it's in Mr. Houston's
interest to have it rescheduled.
THE COURT: Certainly.
time.

That is appropriate at this

And we will recess on this case and handle some of the
14

other matters on my calendar this morning and we'll address
the Houston matter later.
MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, may I be excused to go to
a different court for a moment and handle a different case?
THE COURT: You may.

We'll need both attorneys

obviously and Mr. Houston later on in the morning.
(Off the record.)

THE COURT: Are we in a position to deal with the
Houston matters?
MR. MACK: We are, Judge.
THE COURT: Let's bring Mr. Houston out then.
Mr. Burmester, you are the last one on my list
today.
Also, for the record, I am striking the motion for a
dual jury since that's out now.
(The defendant is brought into the courtroom.)
THE COURT: Mr. Houston is back in the courtroom with
Mr. Mack.
What else do we need to address?
MR. MACK;

Well, Judge, when we were last on the

record, we were talking about how to proceed with this case.
This trial is set for Wednesday of this week.

Our objection

was that the State's failure to comply with the expert notice
requirement mandates -- well, our request was that the
15

witnesses be excluded.
The Court's ruling was that, not for reasons of the
State's —

well, let me restate that.

The Court's ruling, if

I understand it, was that you were not going to exclude that
evidence based on their failure to comply with the notice
requirement.

That then bought us to the discussion of whether

we could go ahead on Wednesday with the trial.
We can't.
witnesses.

We're not prepared to confront those

But we would like to state again for the record

that we feel that the remedies available to the Court are
either exclusion or a continuance.

The Court has indicated

neither of those options but that the State can proceed with
those witnesses on the date that's scheduled this week.
I consulted with my office about the ramifications
of that, whether that would hurt any appeal rights of
Mr. Houston if I were to proceed not being prepared.

And it

was the determination that it may be considered to be inviting
error.

For those reasons, I guess we can't go forward on

Wednesday.
But I don't think that we should be in the position
of having to ask for a continuance, although that seems to be
where we have been placed.

And we think that that's violative

of Mr. Houston's due process rights.
on expert notice.

It violates the statute

And I guess we need to then reschedule this

trial.
16

THE COURT: And I just want to clarify my ruling a
little bit.
It is true that I have ruled that I will not exclude
the testimony or the expert witnesses based on the
noncompliance with the 30 days because I just simply did not
find the bad faith necessary in the failure to comply with the
30-day notice.

The State has done it as quickly as they can

in the trial setting.

And so by not excluding the testimony,

or excluding the witnesses I guess, by default, I guess that
means I am granting the continuance and it is to the
requesting party.
What I asked the defendant then was, based on the
fact that there is currently before me a 120-day disposition,
I needed to have the input as to whether or not the defendant
felt he could be prepared to go forward so that, even though
the remedy I have provided and the remedy that is provided by
statute is a continuance for the proponent party, I wanted the
input as to whether or not the defendant felt that he could
have a fair trial and be adequately prepared.

That is the

answer that Mr. Mack has given me today after consulting with
both his client, Mr. Houston, and with the office.

And they

do not feel that they can be fairly prepared for the series of
charges without having more time to examine the testimony
which I have not excluded.
The continuance, therefore, I guess, technically, is
17

being granted to the State because they have not provided,
technically, the 30-day notice and they do need to do that.
But the issue before me, which was more important to me, is
just the granting of a fair and timely trial for Mr. Houston.
The 120-day disposition date, my understanding,
after reviewing the calendar with both Mr. Mack and
Mr. Burmester, is April 12th.

We can do what flexibility we

need to set that during that time frame.

The defendant is not

waiving that 120-day request.
Again, I know that there are other issues that I
need to balance that against.

And I will set it as quickly as

we can, but we are to the March 11th date.
within a month.

That puts it

I do have several other jurys that are set,

many of them in custody, and I'll throw out some dates and see
what we can.

Whether or not that can be before April 12th is

another issue.
We have three days requested for this trial?
MR. BUFMESTER: I think that would be best, to have
three days.
THE COURT: Have we received any word on whether the
27th, 28th and 29th

~

(Discussion off the record.)
MR. MACK;

You know, I should let you know that I am

out of town the week of the 25th and the first week of April.
THE COURT: And the week of the 25th is a week that I
18

had another murder trial scheduled.

We filled it up with

other things, in fact, with another jury.

If that date is not

available to Mr. Mack, then —
COURT CLERK;

That one is not in custody.

THE COURT: So we could do it.

But you're out of

town that week and April 1st as well?
MR. MACK: I?m actually in town on the 1st.

But the

rest of that time, the 25th through the 5th, I am out of town.
THE COURT: The week of the 8th I am on master
arraignment calendar so that is the one week that is totally
unavailable to me.

And the 15th is the master pretrial

calendar, so I don't have any options on that.
then that —

That means

so I suppose we could look to next week but I

have misdemeanor juries set.
MR. BURMESTER: I don't know if that still gives them
30 days.
THE COURT: Yeah.

All right.

MR. BUFMESTER: I'm not sure what that does.
THE COURT: You gave the notice on what date, on the
25th?
MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, I'm sorry, I didn't bring
my file over.

There's three separate documents.

precise date they went out, I'm not sure.

And the

But I know it was

the week of the date that we actually set a trial date.
THE COURT: And that, I believe, was on February
19

25th.

Let me check on the docket.
We scheduled the March 13th date on February 25th.

And that is simply not even 30 days outside.

The trial date

was set closer than the 30 days from the date that this was
first set for trial. And that's the basis of my ruling, not
for excluding.
If we go to the 27th of March, that is 30 days from
the 25th.

And it wouldn't have been amy earlier and it may

have been a day or two later.

So we are going to be to the

week of April 1 before the 30-day notice has run.
Do you want to set it on April 24th, 25th and 26th,
which is actually a felony week?

And we may have some

in-custody but it won't have the additional issue of the
disposition.
Who have I got on the 24th, 25th and 26th of April?
(Discussion off the record.)
THE COURT: All right.

Let's set this for April 24,

25 and 26. And the record will reflect that that is past the
120-day disposition.

The Court knows that as we are doing it

and it's past the 30 days for the expert-witness notice. But
it is the soonest I can set it on the calendar, given that the
defense counsel is not going to be here the first week of
April and the 8th and 15th are master calendars for the Court.
And I don't have the flexibility of setting during those
weeks, so I am setting them the next available date that I
20

have for a felony jury.
MR. MACK: Should we set one more pretrial?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. BUFMESTER: Sure.

THE COURT: Yes, and also deal —

do we still need to

further deal with the State's motion in limine as to the
admissibility of DNA testimony substantively, or was your only
objection to the notice?
MR. MACK: Well, why don't you give me a cut-off time
to file an objection to that, Judge.
THE COURT: It is a motion in limine and so you would
not necessarily need to do that, but I think it is
appropriate.

We can just set a time and the State can respond

on that.
MR. BUFMESTER: Your Honor, if I may follow up.
cited to —

I

I think it was in Judge McCleve's court.

THE COURT:

Butterfield?

MR. BUFMESTER: Yes, in Butterfield.

That case has

since been appealed and had an opinion rendered.

And I will

provide the Court that opinion, which my understanding, in
essence, it upholdfs Judge McCleve's ruling.
THE COURT: When did that ruling come down, last
summer?

It was before you made the motion in limine.
MR. BUFMESTER: Yes.

I tried to get it in as quick

as I could but I didn't have time to alter the memo.
21
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5
The second thing is Gabriel Behr, serology, it is the State's point

1
2

that it went out with the initial discovery, but certainly was completed by January

3

16*.

4

THE COURT: Was that before the prelim?

5

MR. BURMESTER: That is mid-way. It is mid-way through the

6

prelim. Again on January 15*, it was a half day. We couldn't continue on the

7

16*, so we it was continued until the 24* when it was completed.

8
9

Todd Rigley's report, he is the DNA expert and the State received
his report on the evening of January 15*, after the first day of the preliminary

10

hearing. And the prosecutor handed both defense counsel copies of his report on

11

the morning of the 16 and that report was submitted as evidence at the preliminary

12

hearing on January 24*. Again, the State is not saying that that is sufficient to

13

comply with the statute. It is not, but I think it does affect whether this Court

14

believes there has been bad faith and therefore good cause or not good cause.

15

THE COURT: Any further response on that, on this motion?

16

MR. MACK: Well, very briefly, Judge. So if I am hearing right

17

and getting the dates right, by January 16*, it sounds like the State is saying that

18

they have possession of it and have shared all expert reports by that date. So they

19

well have complied with part of the statute well in advance of the trial being set,

20

but it needs to be fully complied with, within 30 days of the trial being set. And it

21

seems like the rest of it could have been done as well: the CV's or any other

22

additional information they need to provide to comply with the statute.

23

I think other than that, Judge, we will submit it.

24

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Again, I would like to make

25

sure that the record is clear and as much as the record, the parties are clear in that

6
1

this is an issue that may resolve an important issue. And certainly Mr. Houston

2

had made the request to basically have pending cases resolved within the 120-day

3

time period that is allowed for in-state circumstances like this one is. And he, in

4

fact, Mr. Burmester, I believe, has been approaching all of these trial settings with

5

that in mind. That Mr. Houston made that request early, and it is something that I

6

need to look at seriously. But at the same time, I need to weigh everything and

7

decide what is reasonable and what is not reasonable. And in fact that is why the

8 findings that I need to make are not just whether or not it was one party or the
9

other who made a mistake, or one party or the other who didn't comply. I need to

10

be able to look at all of the circumstances and see whether or not the delay is

11

reasonable.

12
13

The delay in this case isfromthe April 12th date then. I don't
believe there is any contesting on that, that the April 12th date would have been the

14 first one that I need to determine. Correct? April 12th is the 120-day detainer?
15

MR. MACK: Correct.

16

THE COURT: And so the question is whether setting this trial then

17

past that date, and with it being set on the 24th, it is 12 days then past the April

18

12th date, was reasonable or whether there was reasonable cause for doing that.

19
20

One of the delays certainly has to be that it was continued back in
| February when it wasfirstprelimmed and bound over to me and I first got the
case in early February, that there was a delay at the arraignment because there

22

I needed to be conflict counsel. And again, I don't know that it is necessary that I

23

actually attribute to one side or the other what the delay was, but it is clear that

24

J with the two defendants still pending trial that there needed to be a conflict

25

j counsel. And that certainly does not unreasonably delay the case.

The expert discovery issue is a little bit more problematic just in
that there are some very specific statutory requirements that the State needs to
make in order to meet their discovery requirements. They are required to bring in
4

an expert witness. And again, Mr. Burmester apparently has met those

5

requirements as far as giving the explanation and even attempted to give all of the

6

information as quickly as this matter was set, but the matter was not set out 30

7

days. Thefirsttrial date was within 20 days, so we technically could not make

8

that 30-day notice requirement. Now whether he could have provided that

9

information, even before I had set it for trial, is what Mr. Mack is arguing, and

10

because of the fact that this has been presumed that it was going, and it has looked

11

like it was going to trial, the defendant has wanted it to go to trial, and everybody

12

has anticipated that it is going to go to trial, is meaningful argument but I do not

13

think it is reasonable to say that it was not even bound over and any appearance

14

before me and set for any trial date. I am notfindingthat their failure to comply

15

was disingenuous because they really had to give what information they can and

16

simply did not meet the technical requirement of the 30-day notice because the

17

trial was set sooner than 30 days.

18

They said they gave the information as quick as they could and

19

even then the remedy for that is not to keep out the evidence but the remedy for

20

that is a continuance. And I asked the defendant at that time, given the fact that

21

we had two conflicting issues for a delay, as whether he wanted the time to have

22

that expert testimony information, or if he wanted to stay the 120-day time period.

23

And Mr. Mack talked with his office, discussed it with Mr. Houston, looked into

24

the issues and determined that they did in fact need the time to correlate and

25

adequately prepare.

8
1

Again, that is not unreasonable and, again, it was not something

2

that I am therefore saying that the delay was on the part of the defendant. I am

3

simply looking at all of the circumstances andfindingthat under those facts,

4

without stating that the delay was specifically to the defendant, or specifically to

5

the State, that under all of those facts it was reasonable to give everyone time they

6

needed to meet the statutory requirements of expert notice, and that the delay was

7

not unreasonable to reset this trial. The resetting was done as quickly as we

8

could.

9

A number of days were discussed and this was the first day that we

10

could get all parties here, so the April 24th date, which is scheduled this week and

11

which is apparently going forward, is a reasonable date as the court calendar and

12

every other circumstance could be taken into consideration, if Ifindthat it was not

13

unreasonable to delay it because of the expert witness issue and the conflict

14

counsel issue. 1findboth of those reasons good for delay, so I am denying Mr.

15

I Houston's Motion to Dismiss because it was not held within the 120 days.

16

That brings us then - -

17

MR. BURMESTER: May I approach, Your Honor?

18

THE COURT: Yes.

19

MR. BURMESTER:! will just give this to counsel now. He has

20

already received a copy. This is a proposed copy of Findings of Fact, and

21

Conclusions of Law on the issue, and that is a courtesy copy to the Court. And,

22

j of course, it needs to go through counsel before the original can come. I will just

23
24
25

give that to you in case if the Court has some problems with it.
THE COURT: I appreciate that. I am asking to have the State
j prepare the proposed Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law on this with these

